For this year's game at Call to Arms, the Wellington Warlords annual convention held at St Pats Kilbirne, we decided to play a "what if" scenario of Operation Vigorous, where the British are trying to run a large convoy from Alexandra to resupply the belegered island of Malta against strong German and Italian air and sea forces. we used General Quarters 1 and 2 rules to play out the scenario. I took the British while my worthy opponent Paul Reynolds ran the Axis forces.
Here is the background rationale to the scenario:
Mid 1942 found British fortunes in the Mediterranean at their lowest ebb. In North Africa the British Army is being steadily pushed back into Egypt. Food supplies on the besieged island of Malta are at critically low levels. The islands fighter defences as well as its offensive aerial and naval capabilities were at an all-time low, pounded on a daily basis by Sicilian based Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica bombers. To relieve Malta it was planned to run two large simultaneous convoys from both the Eastern and Western ends of the Mediterranean to deliver enough supplies to enable the siege to be lifted and restore the islands striking forces to once again seriously interdict the Axis supply routes to North Africa.
From the west convoy WS19Z sailed from the Clyde on 4 June 1942 covered by units from the Home Fleet as part of Operation Harpoon, expecting to arrive in Malta late on 15 June.
From the east convoy MW11 (Operation Vigorous) would be covered by the much-reduced Mediterranean Fleet, supplemented at the insistence of Churchill himself by heavy units as well as cruisers and destroyers from the Eastern Fleet. The decision to risk battleships and carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean again after the disastrous Crete campaign a year earlier was taken with great reluctance by the Admiralty as a late change to the original plan for Vigorous. With the Japanese severely checked at Midway in early June 1942 the chances of another Japanese carrier raid into the Indian Ocean similar to the one during April 1942 in the near future were considered to be very slight. Against the wishes and advice of Admiral Somerville, the C-in-C Eastern Fleet, three battleships (including HMS Warspite his normal flagship!) and two fleet carriers have been rushed through the Suez Canal to join the Mediterranean Fleet only days before the upcoming operation.
Rather than command from ashore Admiral Harwood, victor of the Battle of the River Plate and himself only recently appointed as C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet, will now hoist his flag on board HMS Warspite. His mission is now twofold – he must use the force he has been given to ultimately deliver the 11 merchantmen of MW11 safely to Malta and, should the Regia Marina (“RM”) offer battle during the convoy’s passage, he is expected to vigorously protect the convoy against the Italian battlefleet, while conserving his major fleet units.
Aboard each of the carriers one of the resident Albacore/Swordfish TSR squadrons has been replaced by additional fighters for protection from the heavy air raids expected to be sent against the convoy. Given the short period prior to the beginning of the operation the only additional FAA fighter units available within the Eastern Fleet are two flights from 803 and 806 Sqns equipped with now somewhat obsolete Fairey Fulmar fighters. These units were based in Ceylon during the Japanese sortie into the Indian Ocean during April 1942.
As well as the FAA units on board the carriers the British have assembled a number of land based strike aircraft based in Malta and North Africa to operate against any enemy sortie. The remaining B-24D heavy bombers from the USAAF’s Halverson Detachment have been made available and RAF Beaufort torpedo-bombers of Nos 42 and 217 Squadrons, en-route to Ceylon, have been have been held on various Maltese and North African airfields to support the operation rather than being allowed to continue on to the Far East.
The Axis knew that a major convoy operation to relieve Malta was imminent and arrayed their forces accordingly. They drew up a threefold plan to assault any convoy from the East. Firstly submarines disposed along the presumed course of the convoy would attack, followed by air attacks by Regia Aeronautica and Luftwaffe units based in Crete, North Africa and even the Aegean as the convoy proceeded through “Bomb Alley” to the south of Crete. At night MAS boat and Kriegsmarine S-boat flotillas would stand ready to cause further damage, before the convoy and its escort was bought to action in the waters east of Malta by the RM’s heavy units early on the 15th June, which had sortied at the order of Mussolini himself.
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Here is my view of the game written up as a report by Rear Admiral Vian, the senior surviving RN officer who took part in the Operation:
Report of Proceedings of Operation Vigorous 15 June 1942
by R Adm P.L. Vain commanding 15th Cruiser Squadron
Senior Surviving Officer
To:
The First Sea Lord
The Admiralty
London
Sir, as senior surviving officer of Operation Vigorous I present below a report of proceedings of the operation.
As the convoy and its many escorts passed to the South of Crete during the night of 14/15th June all ships went to action stations before dawn in the expectation of a surface action against Admiral Inchino’s force, which had been reported by one of our submarines earlier on the 14th as it sortied from Taranto.
Though subsequently sighted by one of our defensive line of patrolling submarines placed to the North of the convoys route, the submarine in question was not able to work into an attack position before the Italian fleet passed to the South East at high speed. However, due to the actions of the strong escort force, no enemy submarines were able to attack the convoy or the escorting force either prior to the main engagement.
The C-in-C agreed with his staff’s recommendations for the distribution of the escort force and the following dispositions were made:
Battlefleet:
1st Battle Squadron – Warspite, Revenge, Ramillies
4th Cruiser Squadron (4CS) – Newcastle, Birmingham
15th Cruiser Squadron (15CS) – Aurora, Dido, Cleopatra
2nd, 7th, 14th & 22nd Destroyer Flotillas (14 DD)
Carriers:
Illustrious, Formidable
From 15th Cruiser Squadron – Hermione, Euraylus
12th Destroyer Flotilla (3 DD)
Convoy:
10 Merchant ships, 1 Tanker
From 15th Cruiser Squadron – Coventry
5th Destroyer Flotilla (9 Hunt class DD)
11th Escort Group (4 Flower class corvettes)
14th Minesweeping Flotilla (2 Bangor class minesweepers)
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| View of the convoy itself |
The battlefleet deployed with one cruiser squadron and two destroyer squadrons on each beam and long-range radar surface contacts were soon reported to the North West. Shortly afterward two large formations of enemy aircraft were detected, prompting the carriers to accelerate their launching of the planned combat air patrol as the “bandits” approached.
As the two formations approached they were engaged by the already airborne fighters. While holding their own against the sleek Me109F’s, which were escorting both flights of bombers, our Martlets (American F4F-4 Wildcats) suffered significant losses. It was indeed to the credit of the officers and ratings of the two carriers that more fighters were able to be launched just before the two raids arrived almost simultaneously.
The enemy adopted a bold strategy of attempting to first knock out the two carriers before attacking the convoy itself, though on this occasion the C-in-C’s cruiser dispositions proved more than equal to the task of defending against determined enemy air attack. With events of January and May 1941 firmly in mind the crews of both Illustrious and Formidable were able to this time to drive off the attacks with the assistance of their dedicated Dido class AA “minders”.
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| The Carrier Force |
Illustrious once again faced a strong attack by Luftwaffe Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers, as she had in early 1941. This time they were flying from North African bases and were able to attack unmolested by the FAA CAP, which was in turn fully engaged by the Me109F escort. However, the heavy barrage fire from the carrier’s 16 4.5” DP guns and HMS Hermione’s 10 5.25” DP guns combined with much 2pdr pom-pom and 20mm close range fire seemed to greatly disrupt the attackers. Our AA umbrella was observed to account for several of the enemy dive bombers without cost to our forces, though Hermione was near missed twice by 1000lb bombs from the attackers.
Astern, HMS Formidable also came under heavy attack, this time from Ju88’s operating from Crete. Some of the hastily launched CAP Martlet’s were able to intercept the bombers and at least disrupt some of the enemy bombers. Another heavy barrage from Formidable and HMS Euraylus saw off the remaining attackers without damage.
The cost to the defending fighters was high, with around 50% either lost or damaged. The C-in-C soon signalled Rear Admiral Boyd, commanding the carriers, to range a maximum effort torpedo attack using all available torpedo bombers as he had sighted the Italian battlefleet.
On board Warspite the dawn arrived quickly, bringing another hot clear summer day so typical of the Med. From her spotting top smoke was soon sighted which proved, as expected, to be the Italian fleet coming into view, including two of the powerful new Littorio class battleships.
At a range of some 30,000 yards the leading battleship opened fire on the Warspite, but her first salvo fell well wide. Warspite soon responded with her two forward turrets, landing a solid hit on the Italian flagship, but causing only minor damage. The C-in-C was keen to close the range and so the battlelines stood on, with Warspite opening her gun arcs enough to enable full broadsides to be fired.
On each beam of the Littorio a division of cruisers and a destroyer flotilla quickly worked up to their maximum speeds of over 35 knots and attempted to encircle the British on each flank. To counter this move 4CS and 22DF were ordered to engage two heavy cruisers to starboard, identified as a Trento class and the Gorizia, the last remaining Zara class ship afloat.
Meanwhile the 15CS and 7DF were tasked with fighting the two Condotteri type light cruisers to port which were rapidly approaching. HMS Aurora, the leading ship of 15CS was soon hit hard by its two opponents and fell out of line as she slowed, the fight instead being taken up by her two Dido class squadron mates. As these Italian cruisers got boldly closer to our battle line I, as CS 15 commander, ordered 7DF to attempt a torpedo attack on them under the cover of a smokescreen. I wish to point out the conduct in particular of the crews of HMS Nestor and HMS Norman, both of which showed great courage and daring when ordered to attack with torpedoes. Ultimately these attacks were unsuccessful due to the high speed and manuvering of the well-handled enemy ships, though they were forced to turn away violently which allowed the now heavily damaged Aurora to withdraw somewhat.
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| Mid game view of the two fleets from the Italian side |
On the other beam the two Town class cruisers used their 6” guns to engage the two enemy cruisers, damaging the Trento more due to its thinner armour. HMS Newcastle was damaged by enemy fire, but was still able to be fought effectively. Of more concern was a supporting flotilla of enemy Soldati class destroyers that was observed closing our battleline. 22DF was ordered to go forward and engage these destroyers at once.
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| Same view of the two fleets from the British side |
In the meantime our battleline continued to steadily close the range on the enemy battleline. Early on Warspite’s long range gunnery was impeccable as she hit the Italian flagship again, but their return fire soon became accurate as well, steadily diminishing Warspite’s speed and fighting abilities over a period of time.
Battles are sometimes decided by the slimiest of margins, or by a particular event. In the case of Vigorous I believe that moment came at around 0648 GMT. As part of Operation Vigorous co-operation with the RAF had been excellent and all their scheduled long range CAP patrols by Beaufighters flying out of Malta had been fully provided. On receipt of the “Enemy in Sight” report Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh Pughe Lloyd had immediately dispatched his carefully husbanded RAF torpedo strike force from Malta to attack the Italian fleet. This force comprised of just 9 Beauforts drawn from Nos 42 and 217 Squadrons, escorted by a single flight of Beaufighters of No 252 Squadron.
While the Beaufighters were able to successfully engage the small German CAP of Me110D fighters orbiting over the Italian fleet the Beauforts roared towards the Littorio at very low level, pressing home their attack through a heavy flak barrage as the battleship took violent evasive action. Of the six torpedoes released one was reported as a clear hit, however a hit at an acute angle or a faulty exploder pistol meant that the warhead did not detonate and no damage was inflicted. (If I had rolled anything but a one the Littorio would have suffered a hull damage result of some sort, which with other damage could have possibly caused her to withdraw!).
Given the now rapidly approaching Italian destroyers and the realisation that, even at their best speed 22DF was not going to be in a position to intercept them, the C-in-C ordered Warspite to turn away at her best, but now much reduced speed. The flagship was now in danger, having been hit again by another accurate salvo from the Littorio.
Once within range the Italian destroyers commenced a well executed torpedo attack on the battleline, but it was the much damaged HMS Warspite which was their principal target. She was struck by at least two of torpedoes and her end came quickly.
The C-in-C is believed not to have survived from accounts of the surviving officers and men and is not listed amongst those subsequently advised as being rescued by the Italians either.
Therefore, as Senior Officer present I assumed command and reluctantly decided to order our forces to return to harbour.
At this time I believed the chances of successfully fighting the convoy through to Malta were minimal for the following reasons:
· The loss of the flagship meant the Italians had a numerical advantage in capital ships;
· The damaged condition of at least three of our five cruisers;
· Admiral Inchino’s force was not withdrawing from the area that the slow convoy would have to pass through to get to Malta;
· The FAA torpedo strike from the carriers, although airborne, was still some distance from the scene of the fleet action and the low speed of the torpedo aircraft meant that they would still have to spend several tactical turns to position themselves to attack. During that time the tactical situation could have deteriorated further;
· A force of American B-24D’s level bombers was en-route to attack the Italian fleet but our experience in the Med since 1940 against Axis aircraft using level bombing has shown that the chances of hitting a fast moving ship are minimal at best.
The Italians, with damaged ships of their own and with limited fuel available did not pursue and returned to Taranto in due course, well aware that they had on this occasion successfully stopped Malta being resupplied with an meaningful amount of supplies.
The simultaneous convoy operation run from Gibraltar (Operation Harpoon) during June 1942 was slightly more successful, though only two fast merchantmen were able to be bought into Grand Harbour giving barely two more months of supplies.
Another major operation will therefore be required to be mounted by August 1942. This has been designated as Operation Pedestal and planning is already in progress…..
